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Abstract: 
The objective of this study is to examine India’s transformation from a colonial to a modern economy on the 
basis of the macro-economic level changes that have occurred over the last century. This is important because it 
will help us to understand the associated growth performance and its impact on sectoral changes and 
employment in the wider context of developing economies such as India. The methodology to be followed here 
is derived from the aims of the study and comparisons of international statistics that provide the means by which 
to address the research questions and the objectives of this paper. The study found that during the colonial 
period, the Indian economy became subservient rather than sovereign in terms of policy matters. As a result, 
economic development was hampered by the removal of ‘surplus’, along with very high land rents and tribute 
charges. A densely populated country like India was drawn into the orbit of exploitation in the mid-18th century. 
Soon after independence in 1947, the Indian government took a number of initiatives to enhance industrial and 
agricultural development, but the biggest failure was that it did not make any real impression on the country’s 
huge unemployment problems. 
Keywords: Indian economy, colonial period, famines, growth rates and neoliberal reforms.  
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyse economic policy and its performance in India during the 
past century. In doing so, the article examines the limitations of such policies. This study is 
important because India is the second-largest populated country in the world, now having 
almost has same population as China, and also the study of a longer period of economic 
changes and polices provides us with a better understanding of the past and present. A critical 
examination of the Indian economy, besides India, can also help other developing countries 
to draw lessons from its strengths and weaknesses.  
The methodology to be followed here is derived from the aims of the study and comparisons 
of international statistics that provide the means by which to address the research questions 
and the objectives of this paper. Analysing pre-existing secondary data is the only possible 
way to obtain macroeconomic data. These include data from official sources and from 
international institutions such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund), World Bank and 
OECD. Due to the nature of the topic, it is considered that such methods will be appropriate 
to undertake this study. 
The objective of this study is to examine India’s transformation from a colonial to a modern 
economy on the basis of the macro-economic level changes that have occurred over the last 
century. This is important because it will help us to understand the associated growth 
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performance and its impact on sectoral changes and employment in the wider context of 
developing economies such as India. 
In recent years, India has experienced remarkably high economic growth rates, which have 
led to much speculation in the media that India is an emerging economic superpower. 
However, such discussions have overlooked the fact that this growth has not been 
accompanied by an associated rise in equality or reduction in social ethnic conflict. However, 
despite all failings and mistakes, the records of Indian government since the country became 
independent (about 70 years ago) in most respects has shown vastly better growth and 
performance than under the previous British colonial rule, especially on such indices as GDP 
growth rates, living conditions, health, literacy rates, life expectancy and overcoming famine 
and mass hunger (Siddiqui, 2015).  
We need to look at basic facts about India’s experience with British colonialism and why 
colonial (mis) rule cannot be put aside. The study also intends to examine the legacy of the 
British Raj and also post-colonial development, and also that later failures do not in any sense 
invalidate my criticism of colonial exploitation and subjugation. British economic historian 
Angus Maddison (2003) calculated that India’s share of the world economy was a quarter of 
the world’s GDP in the mid-18th century, larger than that of all European countries combined 
at that time. In fact, in 1705, this figure was as high as 27% when Mughal Emperor 
Aurangzeb ruled the country. By the time the British departed India, GDP share had dropped 
to 3% (Tharoor, 2017). The reason was that India was ruled to benefit Britain and, as a 
colony for two hundred years, India was financing not only the industrialisation of Britain but 
also its military ventures in Asia, East Africa and the Middle East (Bagchi, 2010).  
This article is organised as follows. Following the introduction to this topic in section 1, 
section 2 will briefly discuss the colonial legacy. Section 3 analyses the economic policies 
and performance of the post-independent period, in particular from 1947 to 1990, whilst 
section 4 examinees the period of neoliberal economic reforms, i.e., from 1991 to date, 
followed by a conclusion which summarises the findings.  
At independence in 1947, modern large-scale industries and mining constituted just 7% of 
India’s GDP, while small-scale industries accounted for 10%, the agricultural sector, 49%, 
and services and construction, 34%. Total employment in the industrial sector was just 2.9 
million people, which amounted to less than 2% of the total workforce. In contrast to this, 
small industries employed a much higher proportion, some 7% of the workforce, while nearly 
72% of the Indian workforce was employed in agriculture; services including construction 
employed 18.7%. Cotton and jute were among the main modern industries established in the 
early 20th century in India (Siddiqui, 1996).  
The tasks for independent India in 1947 were to accelerate the transition towards a modern 
economy, as dominated by industry. This was because at the eve of independence, the 
agricultural sector accounted for half of the country’s GDP and modern industry contributed 
only 7% of the total GDP. In fact, despite the development of a few industries during colonial 
rule, India was still predominantly an agrarian country with low productivity that suffered 
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from widespread poverty and illiteracy. During the 1950s, the government took a number of 
measures in industrial and agricultural sectors through public investment in accord with its 
plans to establish several heavy and capital-intensive industries in crucial areas such as steel, 
machines and tools, power generation, and in irrigation and technical and scientific 
institutions such as the Indian Institute of Technology. As a result, in the 1950s growth rates 
rose to be higher than the previous decades, but still lower than other East Asian economies 
(Siddiqui, 2016a). The most important issue was that this growth left unemployment and 
poverty largely unaffected. Moreover, by the late 1960s, the economy began to slow, 
heralding the start of a crisis that subsequently became more severe in the late 1970s and in 
the early 1980s where in order to fund populist measures the government resorted to heavy 
foreign loans. This seemed, and indeed was, to represent only short-terms relief for the 
country, and the situation became more critical in the 1990 (Siddiqui, 2018). 
World oil prices rose in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and, as a result, 
India’s import bills increased sharply; so, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, India 
experienced a balance of payment crisis. During that time, the then Finance Minister 
Manmohan Singh in his budget speech stated: “There is no time to lose. Neither the 
government nor the economy can live beyond its means year after year. The room for 
manoeuvre, to live on borrowed money or time, does not exist anymore. Any further 
postponement of macro-economic adjustment, long overdue, would mean that the balance of 
payments situation, now exceedingly difficult, would become unmanageable and inflation, 
already high, would exceed limits of tolerance” (Ministry of Finance, 1991-92). 
India asked for an IMF loan in 1991 and, in return, the country was asked to implement 
neoliberal reforms also known as ‘Structural Adjustment Programmes’ (Siddiqui, 2012). The 
mainstream economists welcomed this and emphasised that these reforms would increase 
competition and efficiency. According to them, any distortions were associated with 
government intervention and regulation of markets and the crucial issue of aggregate 
employment determination. Any distortions induced by the government involving the use of 
monetary and fiscal policy to raise employment would merely generate inflation. They 
maintained that economic development requires rapid GDP growth, which has a “trickle-
down effect”, ultimately benefitting the poor (World Bank. 2016). 
2. India’s Colonial Legacies 
It is widely recognised that, until 1760, India was the second-largest manufacturing economy 
after China. India exported cotton textiles to Africa, Europe and South East Asia (Bagchi, 
2010). As J. T. Sunderland (1929:367), a British-born and US minister, noted, “India was a 
far greater industrial and manufacturing nation than any in Europe or any other in Asia. Her 
textile goods-the fine products of her looms, in cotton, wool, linen and silk-were famous over 
the civilized world; so were her exquisite jewellery and her precious stones…; so were her 
fine works in metal-iron, steel, silver and gold… [India] had great architecture…great 
businessmen, great bankers and financiers. Not only was she the greatest shipbuilding nation, 
but she had a great commerce and trade by land and sea which extended to all known 
civilized countries. Such was the India which the British found when they came.” 
4 
 
However, in 1757, Robert Clive defeated Nawab Siraj-ud-Duala and Bengal was taken over 
by the [British] East India Company; at the time, Bengal was the richest province of India. 
However, after the British imposed colonial rule Bengal in 1757, and especially after the end 
of Napoleonic Wars, India’s textile industries were systematically destroyed, large urban 
centres known for textile industries were depopulated, and as result the proportion of people 
dependent on agriculture rose dramatically. The textile industries in Manchester were 
protected, while ‘free trade’ was forced on India. As a result, Indian-made cloths paid higher 
duties than cloths imported from Manchester. This, of course, had very serious implications 
for Indian handicraft industries and for social structure and the structure of the rural economy 
as a whole (Siddiqui, 1990). 
India dominated in global textile trade until 1760, but with the onset of colonialism this no 
longer remained the case. Britain imposed tariffs and duties of 70% to 80% on Indian textiles 
exported to Britain, making their sale unviable for Indian exporters. This made Indian textiles 
expensive in the British markets, while India could not impose retaliatory tariffs on British 
goods since the British controlled the ports and the government (Tharoor, 2017). Under 
colonialism, Indian manufactures did not receive any assistance from the government, despite 
lower wages and locally produced raw materials of which the domestic manufacturers could 
not take advantage. India still grew cotton as a raw material that was exported to Britain. The 
devastation of textiles’ deindustrialisation and the devastation of the textile industry as a 
whole significantly reduced the urban population, which is also known as de-urbanisation. As 
the number of people subsequently dependent on agriculture rose sharply, such development 
drove rural wages down. Of course, there were some good periods too. For example, the 
American Civil War interrupted supplies of raw cotton from the New World. It resulted in a 
boom for Indian cotton growers, but once American supplies were resumed in 1865, they 
suffered again (Siddiqui, 1990).  
In a very short period, India moved from being an exporter of high-quality finished goods to 
a mere exporter of raw materials such as cotton, jute, opium, spices, tea and rice. The huge 
increase in the cultivation of the opium, indigo, tea and jute led to the decline of land 
available for the cultivation of food crops. Between 1770 and 1800, India’s share in the world 
manufacturing exports fell from 27% to 2%, while exports from Britain to India rose sharply 
under the duty-free and free trade regime imposed by colonialism (Bagchi, 2010). 
In the agricultural sector, the British created layers of intermediaries between actual 
cultivators and the landlords who paid land rent directly to the colonial administration. Land 
rent increased sharply as compared to the pre-colonial period, and during the poor monsoon 
and famine, rents were not reduced which led to increased reliance on money lenders who 
exploited the peasants with their high usurious rates of interests, thus keeping borrowers in a 
position of virtual bondage (Bagchi, 2010). 
In contrast to the Mughal period, under the British land revenue system, if the farmers’ crop 
failed he was not exempted from paying taxes. The British revenue system was based on 
potential rather than actual output. The land taxes were not returned in the form of public 
goods or services, but were rather sent to the British government in London. The lack of 
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investment either from public or private sources destroyed Indian agriculture. As Sir George 
Wingate expressed, “Taxes spent in the country from which they are raised are totally 
different in their effect from taxes raised in one country and spent in another. In the former 
case the taxes collected from the population…are again returned to the industrious classes… 
But the case is wholly different when the taxes are not spent in the country from which they 
are raised… They constitute [an] absolute loss and extinction of the whole amount withdrawn 
from the taxed country… [The money] might as well be thrown into the sea. Such is the 
nature of the tribute we have long extracted from India” (cited in Tharoor, 2017:26). 
F. J. Shore, who worked as British administrator in Bengal, testified before the House of 
Commons in 1857: “The fundamental principle of the English has been to make the whole 
Indian nation subservient, in every possible way, to the interest and benefits of themselves. 
They have been taxed to the utmost limit; every successive province, as it has fallen into our 
possession, has been made a field for higher extraction; and it has always been our boast how 
greatly we have raised the revenue above that which the native rulers were able to extort” 
(cited in Tharoor, 2017:16). 
In the 18th and 19th centuries under Britain, opium was produced in India and exported to 
China. The British used the profits from the sale of opium to pay for imports from China such 
as tea, silk and porcelain, which were in great demand in the Europe, while there was no 
demand in the Chinese markets for European-manufactured goods. Consequently, European 
traders had to pay for Chinese products with gold and silver. The [British] East India 
Company established a monopoly on opium cultivation in the Indian province of Bengal, 
where they forced peasants to grow opium poppies. The opium trade solved this chronic trade 
imbalance. The efforts of the Qing dynasty to enforce the opium restrictions resulted in two 
armed conflicts between China and Britain, known as the Opium Wars, i.e., the first opium 
war (1839-42) and the second war (1856-60), when British and France troops attacked, and 
forced China to legalise the opium trade (Bagchi, 2010). 
As Tharoor (2017:5) finds: “Britain’s industrial revolution was built on the destruction of 
India’s thriving manufacturing industries. Textiles were an emblematic case in point: the 
British systematically set about destroying India’s textile manufacturing and exports, 
substituting Indian textiles by British ones manufactured in England. Ironically, the British 
used Indian raw material and exported the finished products back to India and rest of the 
world.” Tharoor (2017:5-6) further notes: “The British destruction of textile competition from 
India led to the first great deindustrialisation of the modern world. Indian handloom fabrics 
were much in demand in England; …For centuries the handloom weavers of Bengal had 
produced some of the world’s most desirable fabrics, especially the fine muslins, light as 
‘woven air’, that were coveted by European dressmakers. As late as the mid-eighteenth 
century, Bengal textiles were still being exported to Egypt, Turkey and Persia in the West, 
and to Java, China in the East, along well-established trade routes, as well as to Europe”. 
On top of this, Paul Baran calculated that about 8% of the India’s GNP was transferred 
annually to Britain as ‘Home Charges’ (Tharoor, 2017). Naoroji’s book Poverty and Un-
British Rule in India, which was published in 1892, presented the ‘drain theory’. According 
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to Naoroji, this transfer of surplus is the main cause of poverty in India (Bagchi, 2010). 
Another study by British economic historian Angus Maddison concluded: “There can be no 
denial that there was a substantial outflow which lasted for 190 years. If these funds had been 
invested in India, they could have made a significant contribution to raising income levels” 
(cited in Tharoor, 2017:22). On top of this, thousands of British officials, who worked in 
India and received inflated wages and pensions and remittances, were another big drain on 
resources.   
However, recently, apologists for imperialism such as Niall Ferguson and others have denied 
that the possession of colonies has benefitted Britain or that it contributed to the destruction 
of the Indian economy and society in any way. This is the reason that it is important to briefly 
examine the economic and social consequences of colonial rule in India. Bagchi (2010: XXII) 
notes: “the years between 1896 and 1913, [Britain superimposed a] long-term downward 
trend in income and living standards… hundreds of thousands of artisans lost their 
livelihoods, productivity-increasing investment in agriculture shrank, and business 
communities in many parts of colonial India were pushed out of the most profitable avenues 
of trade or become subordinate collaborators of European businessmen. India witnessed some 
of the biggest famines in history, in Bengal from 1769, in south India from the 1780s down to 
the 1830s, again between the 1870s and early 1900s in western and southern India, apart from 
many smaller famines that were not officially recognised.” Many artisans became tenants or 
agricultural labourers or simply starved to death during these famines. Moreover, the colonial 
government was insensitive to the deaths of tens of millions of Indians during such periods, 
including several hundred million alone in avoidable malnutrition and poverty-related 
diseases (Sen, 1981). 
After Britain colonised Bengal, the surplus extracted helped Britain in its military success 
against France. As Bagchi (2010: XXVI) emphasised: “the tribute extracted from India 
played a critical part in sustaining the British war against the French, and in facilitating the 
building up of the overseas settlements of Europeans through the process of European 
migration and British foreign investment from the 1870s to the First World War. Moreover, 
the migration of indentured labourers to European-controlled plantations stretching from the 
Caribbean to Malaysia provided sugar, tea, and other plantation products much needed by the 
global capitalist economy. Thus, Indian history is a critical part of global history as, indeed, 
global history is a part of Indian history.”  
Indian nationalists such as D. Naoroji, M. G. Ranade, R. C. Dutt, Mahatma Gandhi and 
Nehru were highly critical of the economic policy pursued by the British colonial 
administration in India. These policies were ‘free trade’ and the role of the state, which was 
only limited to the provisions of construction of ports, railways and roads to facilitate the 
transport of raw materials from interior regions to port and returning British-manufactured 
goods to the Indian markets. Despite certain modifications after World War I, most of the 
profitable industries, for instance mining and plantations were still controlled by British 
businesses. The Indian nationalists viewed that state intervention in the economy could help 
to build basic industries. Unlike imperialist historians such as Vera Anstey, who blamed 
Indian culture for the country’s backwardness and mass poverty in the country (Siddiqui, 
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1996), nationalists, on the other hand, pointed out about the transfer of the annual tribute to 
the British rulers, and also the further drain of resources to finance British military ventures 
from Kabul (Anglo-Afghan War from 1839 to 1842), Burma, Malaysia, Egypt, Sudan and 
Mesopotamia in 1860s. The British Indian Army was not only maintaining India’s security, 
but was also sent on foreign colonial expeditions to fight for British imperial interests. In 
1922, for example, 64% of the total revenue of the government of India was spent on paying 
for British Indian troops despatched overseas (Bagchi, 2010). 
A major characteristic of colonial rule in India led to the destruction of indigenous industries 
and the failure to replace it with modern industries accentuated the situation in India. On the 
top of this, problems were compounded through high taxes, the drain of wealth and negligible 
growth in agricultural productivity and the exploitation of the peasantry by landlords and 
money lenders, reducing the rural population to extreme poverty. This resulted in widespread 
famine throughout India, beginning in 1770 with the Bengal famine which is estimated to 
have killed one-third of the entire Bengali population (i.e., around 10 million). With regards 
to the total number of deaths in major famines in India, British writer William Digby 
calculated that nearly 29 million had died between 1854 and 1901 alone (Sen, 1981). Bagchi 
(2010: XXVI) concluded that: “The process of colonisation of the Indian economy involved 
the extraction of a tribute from the economy at an unprecedented rate. That extraction, in 
turn, required the structural adjustment of the economy in the sense that the domestic 
absorption of the commodities produced by India had to be continually squeezed so as to 
yield an exportable surplus that would be remitted to the ruling country… Deindustrialisation 
in India was accompanied not by reallocation of normally growing resources to agriculture 
but depression of growth rates in both industry and agriculture”. 
In fact, through the control and subjugation of former colonial countries (i.e., periphery), the 
‘core’ had established the practice of setting the prices not only of primary commodities such 
as only oil, and minerals, but also tropical agricultural commodities which could not be 
produced in the temperate regions of the ‘core’ countries. The rise in demand of certain 
tropical agricultural commodities was not accompanied by an increase in their prices, 
however. As Patnaik (2014:3) argues: “The fact that this did not happen, and has not 
happened till date, needs to be examined. And this explanation lies in the fact that capitalism 
imposes an ‘income deflation’ on the people of the ‘outlaying regions’, which restricts, even 
reduces, their purchasing power and hence their demand either for these goods directly, or for 
other goods which are their substitutes in the sense of being producible on the same land 
mass… ‘Income deflation’ ensures increasing amount of goods demanded at the ‘core’, but 
produced on the tropical land mass is made available to it without any increase in their prices 
even though tropical agriculture as a whole remains stagnant”. 
 Share in world GDP in 1990 (Geary-Khamis PPP) international 
dollars) 
 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 
China 23.6 33.0 17.1 8.8 4.6 
India  27.0 16.1 12.2 7.5 4.2 
Developing Countries  71.1 63.0 42.1 29.6 27.0 
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Western Europe 21.3 22.9 32.6 34.1 26.2 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Proportion of the world population 
China 33.0 36.3 28.1 24.4 21.26 
India  21.6 20.1 19.8 16.9 14.2 
Developing Countries  76.2 74.4 67.8 63.2 67.0 
Western Europe 13.2 12.8 14.2 14.9 12.1 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 1: China and India in the World Economy and World Population, 1705-1950 (%) 
Source: Maddison, 2003; Bagchi, 2010; Tharoor, 2017. 
As Table 1 indicates, in 1700 India was the largest economy in the world, and its GDP share 
alone was 27%. However, a few decades after colonisation, India’s share of the global GDP 
had decline to 16.1% in 1820, 7.5% in 1913, and was only 4.2% in 1950. China’s share of 
global GDP declined also, especially in the aftermath of the second opium war, i.e., 33% in 
1820 to 17.1% in 1870, and which continued to decline to 4.6% in 1950 (see Table 1). 
India was one of the richest and most industrialised economies of the world, which together 
with China accounted for about 75% of the world’s industrial output in 1750. In 1600, when 
the [British] East India Company was first established, Britain was producing only 1.8% of 
the world’s GDP, while India’s share was 27%. By 1950, after two hundred years of British 
rule, Britain accounted for 4.2% of the world’s GDP, while India had been reduced to mass 
poverty, illiteracy and hunger. Moreover, between 1900 and 1947, India’s average annual 
GDP growth was 0.9%, while the population was growing at over 3.5% (Siddiqui, 1996), 
which was only negated by the high levels of infant and child mortality that reduced 
population growth to zero and life expectancy to only 27 years. Figure 1 indicates per capita 
economic growth of India between 1920 and 2015. The figure clearly shows that per capita 
income did not undergo any increase during the period between 1820 and 1950. However, 
after gaining independence in 1947, per capita income rose steadily, as indicated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure1. India’s Per Capita GDP from 1820 to 2015  
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Sources: Tables of Angus Maddison (2003). The per capita GDP over various years and 
estimate is retrieved from the IMF (2017); OECD (2017). (accessed on 5 June 2017) 
On social issues such as the Hindu caste system, colonial rule did not make much difference. 
Caste is a reality in Indian society and is the predominant social identity in the villages. The 
castes also reinforce relations of dominance and dependence in rural India. Indian society has 
been marked historically by a level of institutional inequality due to the Hindu caste system, 
which includes even ‘untouchability’ against the ‘lower castes’. Despite the inclusion of 
judicial equality, the colonial administration did not take any concrete measure to undermine 
this caste social inequality. As Patnaik (2016:5) notes: “there was formal equality before the 
law for everybody under colonialism, but this hardly had any impact in weakening caste 
discrimination at the ground level…the absence of alternative opportunities to the most 
menial and degrading occupation, and were even prevented over large parts of the country 
from owning any land. What is more, the ‘lower castes’ were among the worst victims of the 
economic exploitation of the country under colonial rule, through the twin processes of ‘drain 
of surplus’ (which meant a transfer without any quid pro quo of resources to the metropolis) 
and ‘deindustrialisation’ (which meant the destruction of local craft production by import of 
machine made manufactured goods from metropolis). The burden of this exploitation greatly 
increased the pressure of population on land through a process of pauperisation of the 
peasantry, and this growing pressure entailed a lowering of real wages of agricultural 
labourers, among whom, of course, the ‘lower castes’ had an overwhelmingly presence”. 
3. Economic Performance from 1947 to 1990  
After independence, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, recognised that without 
the economic diversification and expansion of Indian industries, the aims of modernisation 
would not be accomplished. He believed that science and technology held the key to India’s 
development and thus the consequent elimination of backwardness and poverty. It was hoped 
that such polices would increase productivity and generate employment, the latter required to 
absorb India’s large number of unemployed and address the poverty and deprivation colonial 
rule left behind. The Second Five Year Plan was launched in 1956 with the target of 
increasing investment in key industries, power and infrastructure. 
The “inward-looking” dirigiste economic strategy was adopted in India from the 1950s 
onwards, which was seen as the most suitable option by the ruling elites. Also known as the 
‘import substitution’ strategy, under this strategy the public sector was assigned a leading role 
in the development process. Between 1951 and 1965, the annual average industrial growth 
was 7%, which was much higher than anything that had been seen in the past. There was also 
a notable shift as the importance of traditional industries such as jute and cotton declined, 
while modern industries such as machinery, engineering, chemicals, rubber, pharmaceuticals, 
power and steel became more important. However, the industrial growth also coincided with 
huge increments in foreign debts and foreign aid, which meant that industrialisation in India 
did not allow for financial self-reliance. Moreover, Indian industries did not allocate much 
money for research and development, which resulted in increased reliance on imported 
technology and foreign multinational corporations. Although pre-reform industrialisation in 
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India was impressive in terms of its growth, it failed to make any real impression on growing 
unemployment (Siddiqui, 2014a). 
However, such policies were criticised by the neoclassical economists as inefficient, 
promoting delays and corruption. The proponents of neoliberal reforms argue that rather than 
adopting the classic Asian strategy - exporting labour-intensive low-priced manufactured 
goods to the West - India has relied on its domestic market more than exports and 
consumption more than investment. In fact, the then government aimed to remove serious 
gaps in the production structure. Due to the long gestation period, private investors saw such 
investments as high risk, and also lacked the funds to support them. In fact, the government 
was determined not to tax the rich. Therefore, for public sector investment funding, the 
government relied on foreign aid, deficit financing and indirect taxation. As a result, for 
example, the share of indirect taxes to the total tax revenue increased from 61.9% in 1955 to 
70.7% in 1966 (Siddiqui, 2015). Both indirect taxes and deficit financing were regressive, 
meaning that they had a dampening effect on income for the majority of people. As a result, 
the domestic market for mass consumer goods did not increase.  
Regarding the agricultural sector, from which nearly three-quarters of India’s population 
received their income, in the 1950s the Indian government passed legislation to implement 
land reforms, including the removal of rent-seeking absentee landlords. But these modest 
reforms were met with opposition from the government’s own minsters and administrators, 
and further agrarian reforms in the 1950s failed to make any real impression on the rural 
inequality. As a result, the reforms failed in removing the agrarian constraints, both in terms 
of the hurdle to the expansion of domestic market and were also in their inability to end the 
landlords’ domination in rural areas. As Das Gupta notes: “This has four dimensions: first, it 
defined the demand constraint in the country and perpetuated the huge labour reserves 
inherited from the colonial period. Second, it ruled out a classical capitalist transformation in 
ruling out a process of development through creation and channelling of an agrarian surplus 
into industry. Third, it perpetuated one of the strongest links in preserving the links between 
caste, gender, and property relations in the hierarchy of definition of property rights. Fourth, 
it ensured the perpetuation of labour regimes based on extra-economic coercion” (Das Gupta, 
2016:123).  
However, post-independent agrarian reform - though not fully implemented and uneven in its 
depth from state to state – did manage to restrict, though not remove, rent-based landlordism, 
and encourage rural capitalism. The land reform measures in the 1950s, while benefitting 
some tenants, failed to break land concentration and the top 15% of landowners continued to 
hold the same percentage of land as before the measures were undertaken (Siddiqui, 1999). 
Rural inequality persisted, which had obvious socio-economic implications as it restricted the 
domestic market, including demands for manufacturing goods. On the social front, few 
changes were witnessed: landlords’ oppressive Hindu caste system remained largely intact 
and untouchables (also known Dalits), who constituted the core of the landless class and were 
denied land ownership under the old Hindu caste system, remained landless (Siddiqui, 
2014b). 
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In the mid-1960s, the rising prices and balance of payment crisis became unmanageable, 
leading to the devaluation of the rupee and forcing India to seek a loan from the IMF. 
Moreover, in the late 1960s, the adoption of HYV (High Yielding Varieties) seeds in certain 
crops, also known as the Green Revolution, raised agricultural output if HYV seeds are 
applied in the correct proportion with water, fertilizers and pesticides. Initially it encouraged 
large landholders towards direct cultivation as additional investment was assured to bring in 
higher profits due to the availability of subsidised credit, irrigation, and fertilizers. Soon, the 
Green Revolution also spread to middle farmers. At the time, this did manage to raise 
agricultural output and yields in certain crops (Siddiqui, 1999); however, now some of the 
negative effects are more visible such as damage to soil, the level of the water table and the 
quality of water. But, overall, it did improve the incomes of certain sections of the rural 
population, which proved to be temporary relief.  
The dirigiste economic strategy brought a very positive change in the industrial sector by 
building industries in key areas such as power generation, steel and manufacturing industries. 
However, it failed to achieve land reforms in the sense of curbing the rural power of the 
landlords and bringing socio-economic equality across the countryside. Despite a number of 
land reform measures, it did not break the social and economic power of the landlords and 
also failed to fully implement the ‘land to the tiller’ policy. The rural poor did not experience 
any betterment as the majority of these sections also belonged to the lower castes. The 
government undertook measures to nationalise banks, which meant more credit was made 
available to the agricultural sector, and subsidies were also extended to agricultural inputs to 
support the ‘Green Revolution’. These measures ultimately increased food production and 
reduced reliance on food imports. However, such dirigiste strategy promoted capitalist 
development in agriculture and exposed certain inner contradictions, especially the fiscal 
crisis of the state. In the 1980s, government began to gradually liberalise trade so that by the 
mid-1980s India’s current account deficit and external debt started to grow. Also, imports 
grew at a faster rate and the rising current account deficit became increasingly financed by 
commercial borrowing and non-resident Indian (NIR) remittances, which meant a greater 
dependence on foreign sources and at higher costs and short-term financing. And as a result, 
India’s foreign debt sharply rose from US$ 20.5 billion in 1980 to US$ 72 billion in 1992, 
making India the world’s third largest debtor after Brazil and Mexico (Nayyar, 2017). 
Another such short relief came in the 1980s in the form of availability of foreign funds for 
borrowing. Actually, the extensive funds from oil exporting countries found their way into 
the Indian financial system. This private financial capital was now available for borrowing, 
and India took this opportunity and borrowed from commercial banks and non-resident 
Indians. Access to such capital allowed the government to increase its debt-financed 
investment. This came as a big relief for the government as the money was used to pay for 
imports that kept domestic inflation under control.  
The government reliance on foreign borrowing provided short-term financial relief and in the 
late-1980s easy access to international credit resulted in the rise of both public and foreign 
debts. Moreover, the Gulf War and decline in remittances from Indian workers in that region, 
a dramatic rise in oil prices and, ultimately, the collapse of Soviet Union, created a very 
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challenging situation for India. All these adverse domestic and international factors led to an 
increase in the current account deficit, which created fear among foreign lenders that India 
may not be able to meet its debt service obligations. As a result, availability of foreign funds 
began to dry up, which led to a sharp reduction in reserves and, in July 1991, a balance of 
payments crisis.  
4. Economic Performance from 1991 to 2017 
India saw a severe balance of payments crisis in 1991, when it approached IMF for 
emergency loans. In return, the IMF demanded the implementation of neoliberal economic 
reforms involving trade liberalisation, a more favourable climate for foreign investors and 
also wide-ranging deregulation measures. The adoption of the ‘Structural Adjustment 
Programme’ meant increased reliance on market forces and a new policy towards foreign 
capital. With the adoption of market-friendly policies towards foreign capital, the net inflows 
of capital rose from less than US$ 1 billion in 1993 to US$ 6 billion by 1999, which further 
rose from US$ 15.7 billion in 2003 to $65 billion in 2014 (Chandrasekhar, 2013). However, 
despite the government’s efforts to attract foreign capital, India still received less FDI than 
other developing countries such as Mexico, Turkey and China, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: FDI Net Inflows across Countries, 2016. 
Source: OECD. 2017:35. http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-india.htm 
 (accessed on 15 January 2018).  
The inflow of capital in such amounts would not have been possible without the relaxation in 
laws governing foreign capital and the removal of regulations regarding foreign shareholding 
and the liberalisation of rules governing foreign investments and repatriation of profit and 
money from India (Siddiqui, 2016a). The sharp increase in non-debt inflows of foreign 
capital, especially in portfolio and foreign direct investment, indicates a new trend. As 
Chandrasekhar (2013:32) concluded: “India’s relationship with foreign capital has shifted 
from muted hostility to one of attracting and wining its confidence, the nature of the regime 
of accumulation has changed as well. These changes had indeed taken India on to a high 
growth trajectory by activating mechanisms that were very different in the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s. The long period of relatively high growth created the impression that… the high 
growth was now irreversible. The argument seeks to establish that… the regimes of 
13 
 
accumulation themselves were fragile, besides the fact that growth driven by dependence of 
financial flows is vulnerable because of the possibility that such inflows can stop, and capital 
outflows could occur, including for reasons unrelated to circumstances in the host country.”  
However, greater reliance on foreign capital pressurised India to implement fiscal reforms by 
bringing legislation in the form of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budgetary Management Act 
(FRBM), which was passed in 2003 to bring down the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio to 3%. This 
was an attempt to restrain any attempt to raise growth based on debt-financed government 
spending (Patnaik, 2016). In the post-2003 period, foreign capital inflows surged, triggering a 
credit boom that was largely available only to rich and upper-middle class consumers for 
housing loans, automobiles, and to government for infrastructure. This created optimism and 
spurred growth, but also increased vulnerability and potential defaulting. In recent years, 
soon after the boom began, non-performing assets in the banking system have risen sharply 
and banks profitability could currently be under threat.  
It seems that the removal of restrictions on technology imports – so that foreign firms will 
find it more attractive to set up collaborative enterprises – would be likely to boost domestic 
production along with foreign capital, technology and management skills. Further capital 
liberalisation measures taken by the government provided opportunities for retail lending in 
Indian commercial banks’ portfolios. Suddenly, the influx of foreign capital provided 
excessive liquidity in the system, which could be lent to consumers to allow the purchase of 
housing, automobiles and consumer durables. This credit was also extended without any 
collateral and on the basis of speculative projections of borrowers’ current earning profiles. 
Such individuals have often borrowed excessive amounts of money from multiple sources 
without revealing this to creditors. The availability of external funds resulted in an increase in 
debt-finance demand in the late 1990s. As Chandrasekhar (2013:20) argues: “[T]here was 
evidence of an incipient change in the regime of accumulation. There were two aspects to this 
change. The first was that private consumption expenditure on manufactured consumption 
goods and private investment in housing began to play a more important role (relative to 
public expenditure) in driving demand and growth. Second, associated with this, were signs 
that debt-financed private consumption expenditure was displacing debt-financed expenditure 
as a leading stimulus to growth.” 
 
Figure 3: Annual Average Growth Increase 2015-16 
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Source: OECD, 2017. http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-india.htm 
 (accessed on 20 January 2018). 
In 2015-16, India’s growth performance was highest in the world, slightly above China, as 
shown in Figure 3. However, only looking at overall growth does not give us the full picture; 
rather, we need to analyse sectoral growth later on in this article. 
On the question of capital stock, during the pre-reform period the public sector was given the 
leading tasks of most capital-intensive projects such as irrigation canals, dams, electricity, 
steel mills, and so on. This accounted for a growing share of the country’s capital stock. The 
public sector constituted 41% of the Indian economy’s total capital stock in the 1980. 
However, the public sector’s share in India’s domestic output has stagnated since the late 
1980s. Indeed, its share in capital stock has declined since 1990 and employment has 
contracted by 10% since mid-1990s. As Nagaraj (2015:42) argues, “The public sector’s share 
in GDP...plummeted to 20% by 2008-09, an unprecedented decline of 5 percentage points in 
five years. However, as the boom went bust after the global financial crisis, the private 
corporate sector floundered, contracting investment demand, and affecting the banking sector 
with burgeoning bad debts... Thus, after more than two decades of economic reforms, in 
2012-13, the public sector’s share in GDP stood at 23% (2 percentage points less than in 
1991), employing 17 million workers (two million less than in 1991)”.  
There is no doubt that since early 1990s industrial production has diversified with 
improvements in the quality of its products. However, the manufacturing sector’s share has 
stagnated at about 15%, while the industrial share has stagnated at around 26% of GDP after 
the reforms (Girdner and Siddiqui, 2008). When we look at the experiences in other 
countries, such as East Asia and China, Indian industries have clearly not done very well. For 
instance, when we compare with China, both countries had roughly same levels of 
industrialisation in the 1950s; India, rather, at this time had slightly more developed 
industries than China, but by 2015 China became the world’s second-largest manufacturing 
country (Siddiqui, 2009), while India ranked tenth, producing one-quarter of China’s 
industrial output (Nagaraj, 2017). As Figure 4 indicates, in 2010, among the top 
manufacturing nations India was above Brazil, while China was second at the top just behind 
US; over just ten years, i.e., from 2000 to 2010, manufacturing declined in the US, but rose 
sharply in China, while India’s manufacturing also increased but to much less of a degree 
than China (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: World Top 10 Manufacturing Nations in 2000 and 2010. 
Source: UNIDO’s International Year of Industrial Statistics, 2014. 
On the subjects of post-liberal reforms and industrial performance, Nagaraj (2017:63) 
summarises that: “the 25-years period can be subdivided into three distinct phases: 1992-96, 
1997-2003 and 2003-14. The first phase represents the initial euphoria of reforms, with 
booming output and investment in the anticipation of a virtuous cycle of faster growth and 
exports. However, with the expectations of a boost in demand not being realised, industrial 
growth decelerated. It coincided with the Asian financial crisis, burst of the dot.com bubble, 
and freezing credit markets in the US in the early 2000s. The period from 2003 to 2014 
represents. …the recant debt-led cycle boom and bust… The turnaround in industrial 
domestic output growth rates [in 2014] not supported by the trends in (i) credit growth and 
(ii) capacity utilisation in industry”. Nagaraj further (2017:67) notes: “the market-friendly 
policy framework constructed over the last quarter century has not served the manufacturing 
sector well, despite faster economic growth, and output diversification. The goal of rapid 
industrialising to catch up with the Asian peers, in an open trade and capital regime 
employing abundant labour for labour-intensive exports, did not materialise”. 
At present, the manufacturing sector contributes nearly 16% to India’s GDP, provides jobs 
for 10% of the country’s total workforce and produces nearly 80% of its total merchandise 
exports. Although the manufacturing sector is relatively small in comparison to India’s whole 
economy, this sector could nevertheless play an important role in raising India’s productivity 
and in its development efforts (Siddiqui, 2014b; 2016b).  
In the light of a recent study by Dani Rodrik (2016), there is a need to revisit the question of 
industrialisation, which is still very important for creating employment, diversifying the 
economy and removing the low productivity workforce from agriculture. However, according 
this study, the increased global integration and liberalisation has led to de-industrialisation in 
some regions. It is very important for a country like India to draw lessons from such a 
potentially adverse impact, which could be a huge destabilising factor in India. As Rodrik 
(2016:2) argues: “With some exceptions, confined largely to [East] Asia, developing 
countries have experienced falling manufacturing shares in both employment and real value 
added, especially since 1980s. For the most part, these countries had built up modest 
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manufacturing during the 1950s and 60s, behind protective walls and under policies of import 
substitution. These industries have been shrinking significantly since then. The low-income 
economies of sub-Saharan Africa have been affected nearly as much by these trends as the 
middle-income economies of Latin America – though there was less manufacturing to begin 
with in the former group of countries…Developing countries are turning into service 
economies without having gone through a proper experience of industrialisation. I call this 
premature deindustrialisation.” Rodrik further narrates (2016:2-3) “There are two senses in 
which the shrinking of manufacturing in low and medium economies can be viewed as 
premature. The first, purely descriptive, sense is that these economies are undergoing 
deindustrialisation much earlier than the historical norms… The second sense in which this is 
premature is that early deindustrialisation may be detrimental effects on economic growth. 
Manufacturing activities have some features that make them instrumental in the process of 
growth”.  
 2013-
14 
2014-
15 
2015-
16 
2016-
17 
2017-
18* 
2018-
19* 
Real GDP* 6.6 7.2 7.6 7.0 7.3 7.7 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 9.4 5.8 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.6 
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) 6.0 2.0 -2.5 2.8 4.0 4.2 
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -6.7 -6.5 -7.2 -7.0 -6.7 -6.4 
Current Account Balance (% of 
GDP) 
-1.7 -1.3 -1.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 3.4 4.9 3.9 0.4 4.3 7.3 
Total Domestic Expenditure 2.0 6.9 8.0 5.4 7.5 7.9 
Exports of Goods and Services, 
National Accounts Basis 
7.8 1.7 -5.2 4.5 4.6 5.2 
Imports of Goods and Services, 
National Accounts Basis 
-8.2 0.8 -2.8 -2.3 5.4 6.3 
Net Exports, Contribution to 
Growth of Real GDP 
4.5 0.2 -0.5 1.5 -0.2 -0.2 
Table 2: India’s Macroeconomic Indicators and Projections (annual % changes), from 2013-
14 to 2018-19. 
Source: OECD, 2017:12. http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-india.htm. 
(accessed on 6 January 2018).  
Note: *GDP measured in market prices (i.e., at factor costs plus indirect taxes, minus 
subsidies). 
Table 2 shows India’s macroeconomic changes (average annual % changes) from 2013-14 to 
2018-19. The figures of 2017-18 and 2018-19 are projected data from the OECD. India’s 
rates are projected to remain above 7% per annum, while the consumer price index is 
expected to remain low. Also, imports will remain higher than exports (see Table 2). 
The share of agriculture in terms of GDP in 1950-51 was 56.7%, while its share in total 
employment was 85% for the same period. The share of agriculture in GDP fell sharply 
thereafter, and by 2014-15 it was 13%, while the fall in the share in the agricultural 
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employment was much slower (55%), and more than half the population still depends on 
agriculture for their livelihood, as shown in Table 3.    
Year 
Share of agriculture in GDP at 
1999-2000 prices (%) 
Share of agriculture in 
employment (%) 
1950-51 56.70 85.0 
1960-61 52.48 77.3 
1970-71 46.00 63.9 
1980-81 40.00 60.0 
1991-92 34.04 58.1 
2001-02 25.18 57.3 
2011-12 14.00 56.0 
2015-16 13.05 55.0 
Table 3: Share of Agriculture in GDP and Employment in India. 
Source: National Sample Survey various years, Central Statistical Organisation, Government 
of India, New Delhi. 
 
Figure 5: Productivity in Agriculture Sector, Cereal Yield, 2015 
Source: OECD. 2017:48. http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-india.htm 
 (accessed on 4 January 2018). 
Although India’s annual growth rate was the highest in the world in 2016, when we look at 
the productivity in agriculture, this is quite low for India and nearly half that of China, as 
indicated in the Figure 5. India’s productivity in the agricultural sector is less than in other 
developing countries such as Indonesia, South Africa and Brazil.   
During the neoliberal reforms, the agriculture sector had been completely ignored, despite 
nearly two-thirds of the population relying on it for employment and income. Also, the 
majority of India’s poor live in rural areas, and rely heavily on the performance of the 
agricultural sector. The 1991, the economic reforms package did not consider specific policy 
regarding agriculture, especially in terms of helping small and medium farmers. Moreover, it 
was presumed that freeing the agricultural markets and liberalising external trade in 
agricultural commodities would provide price incentives, leading to a rapid increase in the 
incomes of farmers and investment in agriculture. With the greater role of market forces 
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leading to a sharp decline in the availability of institutional credit, subsides on fertilizer and 
electricity were also reduced drastically. All these developments increased difficulties for 
small and marginal farmers, who were forced into greater reliance on informal credit from 
money lenders and input from suppliers cum merchants.   
There has been little increase in income and productivity for the people trapped in the 
agricultural and informal sectors, which continue to employ around 90% of India’s entire 
workforce. Agricultural stagnation, poverty, sectarian and religious conflicts have caused 
social instability and political division, which may well plague India in the future (Siddiqui, 
2017a). In order to achieve sustainable growth in the future, India has to radically change the 
direction of its economic strategy towards a domestic wage-led growth and employment 
creation, and also employment diversification to shift workers away from the low-
productivity agricultural sector to activities with higher productivity and value added in 
manufacturing.  
Since the introduction of the reforms, the government’s priority has changed from self-
sufficiency in food production and consumption to production for export. Under the WTO 
(World Trade Organisation), further adoption of trade liberalisation led to the removal of 
restrictions on exports for certain agricultural goods, particularly rice and wheat; import 
tariffs were also removed from a number of agricultural commodities. India becoming party 
to the WTO raised hopes that farmers would benefit from access to global markets. India 
agreed to zero tariffs on a wide range of crops; however, global uncertainties in prices and the 
nature of competition were ignored. Indian farmers operated in highly uncertain and volatile 
global markets, competing against highly subsidised and capital-intensive agribusiness in 
developed countries. When the global prices fell between 1996 and 2002, the adverse impact 
of imports were realised and India was forced to renegotiate with the WTO (Siddiqui, 2016a). 
However, neoliberal reforms overlooked agriculture sector, which was a deliberate policy as 
government was keen to resolve the balance of payments crisis but seemed to have no long-
term strategy. This decision was difficult to understand as about two-thirds of the workforce 
was directly or indirectly employed in agriculture sector in the Indian economy, and also 
more than three-quarters of the poor in rural areas. The economic reforms did not take into 
consideration this very important sector.  
In early 2000s, the rise of demand for IT services abroad has created an IT services boom as 
profits in this sector rose, providing opportunities for further foreign capital investment 
collaborations in this sector. This period also coincided with India beginning to be seen as a 
favoured destination for foreign financial investors. This was also a period when Indian 
businesses went for excessive borrowing from foreign securities. Moreover, in the 2010s, 
capital inflows exceeded the balance of payments leading to an appreciation for the Indian 
currency. In fact, excessive foreign capital inflows have resulted in surplus foreign exchange 
reserves, though it is important to note that these reserves are not earned through exports but 
are rather borrowed from foreign capital investors.  
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With its increased integration with the global market, the Indian information technology (IT) 
industry has grown phenomenally. With the increased demands for software following the 
personal computer (PC) revolution in the 1980s, Indian IT companies have responded to the 
growing demand for networking. The commercialisation of the internet in the 1990s and 
growing demands for IT engineers from India to repair and maintain computers prompted the 
rapid growth of the IT industry. After the economic reforms of 1991, as observed by Das and 
Sagara (2017: 57), “India’s position as the preferred business process outsourcing (BPO) and 
knowledge process outsourcing (KPO) destination in the world had been established. India 
entered the global IT market by capitalising on the demand for low-cost but high-quality 
programming skills… Besides a favourable domestic policy climate and highly attractive 
export promotion schemes, a host of external factors was crucial for the growth of the 
software industry”. Analysing the impressive performance of Indian IT services in recent 
years, Das and Sagara (2017: 57) further note that: “in 2005 alone, the IT and BPO/business 
process management (BPM) business had generated a revenue worth US$ 148 billion 
(amounting to 8.1% of the GDP), and its exports had amounted to approximately US$ 98 
billion. The Indian IT companies have set up to over 600 delivery centres across 78 countries, 
thus maintaining their leadership position in the global sourcing arena... the Indian IT sector 
is still viewed by the major MNCs from the industrialised nations as a destination where 
cheap labour is available”. 
The important question is whether the rapid economic growth was actually due to the 
economic liberalisation policy of the 1991, to which it is often attributed. To answer this, 
Nayyar (2017:45) states: “If we consider the 20th century in its entirety, the turning point in 
economic performance, or the structural break in economic growth, is 1951-52. If we 
consider the period 1950-1951 to 2000-01, the turning point in economic growth is 1980-
81… During the 20th century, the most significant structural break, or departure from the 
long-term trend in economic growth, was 1951-52, followed by 1980-81. In either case, 1991 
was not a turning point….” He further (2017:46) notes: “The biggest failure of the last 25 
years is that, despite such rapid economic growth, employment creation has simply not been 
commensurate. In fact, the employment elasticity of output declined steadily from reasonably 
high levels during 1972-73 to 1983 (0.60) through modest levels during 1983 to 1993-94 
(0.41), to low levels during 1993-94 to 2004-05 (0.17) and 2004-05 to 2011-12 (0.04). In 
fact, between 2004-05 and 2011-12, employment elasticity of output in agriculture (-0.42) 
and in manufacturing (0.13) plummeted, as compared to the 1983 to 1993-94 period when in 
was much higher in both agriculture (0.49) and manufacturing (0.47).” 
5. Concluding Remarks 
India and China were the top two manufacturing nations worldwide until the British conquest 
of Bengal and the defeat of the Chinese in the first opium war. In fact, colonialism degraded 
the Indian economy and squeezed the incentives for local investment in industry and 
agriculture. For the majority of the colonial period, Indian agriculture stagnated and 
foodgrain output fell. As a result, peasants became highly indebted to money lenders and had 
hardly any support from public expenditure on irrigation, soil management or rural 
infrastructure, particularly devastating when the agricultural sector experienced crop failure 
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and drought. The primary goal for the British colonial administration was to extract revenues 
from the peasantry. From the mid-18th century, India’s economy was integrated into the 
British colonial system which, besides extracting surplus value, also imposed an international 
division of labour with unequal terms of trade where India was turned into a supplier of 
primary commodities.  
During the colonial period, the Indian economy became subservient rather than sovereign in 
terms of policy matters. The Indian economic surplus was transferred to Britain, which did 
not lead to job creation into the local economy. As a result, economic development was 
hampered by the removal of ‘surplus’, along with very high land rents and tribute charges. A 
densely populated country like India was drawn into the orbit of exploitation in the mid-18th 
century and, later on, into the interest of British industry. Such development created mass 
poverty, de-industrialisation, starvation and famine across the entirety of India.   
The study found that soon after independence in 1947, the Indian government took a number 
of initiatives to enhance industrial and agricultural development. Initially, these met with 
some modest success including building key industries, becoming self-sufficient in terms of 
food production and improving literacy rates. However, the biggest failure was that it did not 
make any real impression on the country’s huge unemployment problems. By the mid-1960s 
economic growth had begun to falter and the fiscal crisis of the state deepened. Finally, India 
sought an IMF loan in 1991 to avert balance of payment crisis. In return, India was asked to 
adopt neoliberal reforms.  
To compare Indian economic policies under neoliberal reforms with those of the previous 
period under dirigisme would seem to be important, particularly when we consider this 
comparison in terms of employment expansion. In the period of neoliberal reform, the growth 
rates accelerated to 7% annually, but the rate of growth of employment has remained at only 
1%, while in the dirigiste period the average growth rate was 3.5%, but the expansion of 
employment was doubled i.e., 2% annually. It seems that rate of employment growth was far 
below the natural growth rate of the workforce. This is greater when we further consider 
displaced peasants and petty producers due to the accelerated process of “primitive 
accumulation” unleashed by the economic reforms. The neoliberal reform, rather than 
creating new jobs, saw the total number of unemployed rise and the steady growth of the 
relative size of the labour reserve. 
In fact, in the late 1950s and 1960s the industrial sector did witness a sharp rise. For example, 
the share of manufacturing in GDP rose from 9% in 1951 to 16% in 1961. Indeed, a decade 
later this share reached 18% before reaching its peak of 20% in 1996. However, the industrial 
share in GDP was still less in comparison to other developing economies, particularly in East 
Asia. For example, in 1971, the manufacturing share in GDP for South Korea was 25%, 
Malaysia 28%, Thailand 26%, China 35% and Brazil 29% (Siddiqui, 2017b). 
The Indian growth story is one of around 4% per annum from the 1950s through to 1981, and 
then 6.3% from 1982 to 2016 (Nayyar, 2017). The source of recent high growth appears to be 
rooted in services such as real estate, construction, automobiles, IT industries, commercial 
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centres, and the financial sector. Many of these new developments are taking place around 
urban and semi-urban centres. By contrast, India’s rural economy has experienced very slow 
growth and, indeed, near stagnation during the pro-market reform period (Dreze and Sen. 
2013). The study has argued that India’s progress towards industrialisation has been 
disappointing and the optimism that foreign capital and technology would bring efficiency 
and boost growth in manufacturing has largely been proven unfounded.  
Since neoliberal reforms were undertaken in 1991, the agriculture sector hardly saw any 
benefits and, during this period, its growth rates were negligible (Siddiqui, 2010). The pursuit 
of neoliberal economic policies has led to the withdrawal of the state role in assisting farmers 
in particular and the rural sector in general, and is instead promoting the interests of global 
financial capital, with which the Indian corporate capital is closely integrated. Despite the 
fact that the majority of the country’s population has not witnessed any improvement in its 
living conditions, the government nevertheless celebrates this as a “great achievement”; it has 
completely ignored economists such as John Stuart Mill when he said that he did not mind a 
zero growth rate if workers are better off in such a stationary state than in a growing 
economy. For him, improvements in workers’ real incomes should take priority over high 
GDP growth rates.   
It seems that recent growth based on neoliberal economic policies are fragile as their success 
relies heavily on foreign capital inflows (Siddiqui, 1998); if such inflows reverse due to 
external reasons or the global situation, then this could lead to a similar situation as that 
experienced during the 1997 East Asian crisis.  
Now, after more than a quarter of a century since the inception of the neoliberal market 
reforms, it seems that the high growth rate has failed to make any impression in expansion of 
employment. Therefore, the study argues that the problems are not just in rapid growth rates, 
but the reliance on unsustainable stimuli to growth. The current growth is not sustainable as it 
is unable to address the problems of massive unemployment and other forms of social 
deprivation in India. 
India faces many challenges of poverty and growing inequality. It needs to stimulate growth 
within its manufacturing sector rather than increasing dependence on export-led growth, as 
such a strategy relies on foreign demands and markets which are already stagnant and for 
which there is little hope of a dramatic reversal. The study suggests that an alternative 
economic policy is needed, which should be based on raising the incomes of agricultural 
workers, expanding domestic markets, and the revival of public investment in crucial areas 
such as irrigation, education and health. Such measures would eliminate illiteracy and 
improve health and will raise productivity and domestic markets. Therefore, government 
intervention is needed to achieve inclusive growth; such intervention should be aimed at 
increasing employment and redistributing incomes, and ultimately ensuring access to basic 
services such as food, education and health care. 
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